DESCRIPTIVISM

pp. 62 a 65

4.1.1: Artifacts

Peter Geach has argued that "good" is a descriptive term. It describes the way things are. Obviously, however, it does not pick simple attribute like the color red. While the color red is the same in a knife or in a hammer, what is good for a knife may not be good for a hammer. Still, Geach claims, something common can be found between diverse uses of "good": a good knife and a good hammer are both complete in their kind.
The point is more evident with artifacts. A good knife and a good hammer have quite diverse attributes. The good knife must be sharp the good hammer must be heavy and blunt. Nevertheless, something the same is meant by calling both of them good, for both are good insofar as they are complete. A dull knife lacks something of its completion. A sharp hammer would be incomplete in its ability to pound. Similarly, the completion of the lens of an eye requires that it be transparent; the completion of the lid (párpado) of an eye requires that it be opaque.
This notion of completion depends upon the idea of function. Because the function of the knife is to cut it is completed by being sharp through which it cuts well; because the function of the hammer is to pound, it is completed through that by which it pounds well. The various attributes by which something is complete differ. For one thing, the attribute of being sharp makes it complete: for another, the attribute of being dull makes it complete. In either event, completion is whatever helps to realize the function or purpose.
To describe a knife or a hammer as good, then, is to describe something about it. The function included within this description appears to be built into our idea of many artifacts. A chair, for instance, is for sitting upon. Although the word "chair" picks out a family resemblance of diverse objects, the purpose of sitting seems hard to separate from the notion of a chair. Is an old tree stump a chair, since it can be used for sitting? No, for it was not made with the purpose of sitting. unless someone cut the tree stump for that purpose, in which case we might begrudgingly [de mala gana] call it a chair.
"Good chair" describes a real state of affairs in the world. It describes a certain thing with a certain function, and it describes this thing insofar as fulfilling or completing that function The function is itself a kind of direction or movement of the thing to some goal or end. It is fulfilled or completed if the end is achieved or realized
The purposes of artifacts do not originally belong to the artifacts. We make a knife in order to cut, but the purpose of cutting is not some attribute that we can find in the knife: the purpose is in us. When we describe something as a knife, then we are not just describing its attributes; in part, we are describing the purpose we have for these at tributes
Ultimately, however, we ascribe the purpose to the artifact as if the purpose belongs to it; only as such do we describe the artifact as good. If someone happened to find a sharp rock, by which he cut, we would not describe the rock as good in its kind. It might be good as useful, but we would not say it is a good instance of a rock, the way we would say that a sharp knife is a good instance of a knife. Although we recognize that the person has the purpose of using the rock to cut, this external purpose does not affect our judgment concerning the good. Why? Because we do not suppose that the purpose belongs to the rock. In contrast, we do suppose that the purpose of cutting belongs to what it means to be a knife. Only as such can we describe a sharp knife as good in its kind.

4.1.2: Things in Nature

Natural things also have purposes as the purpose of an eye is to see and the purpose of a heart is to pump. These purposes, it seems, are not externally attributed to the things by some maker, as the case with artifacts (unless one wishes to say that the purpose is really in God) The description of an eye includes its purpose, unlike the knife, however, the purpose truly belongs to the eye.
The meaning of "good" for the natural things appear to be no different than for artifacts. It means that the thing has a purpose. And that it realizes this purpose. We ascertain whether an eye is good by knowing what an eye is, including its purpose, and determining whether this particular eye realizes its purpose or in some way falls short of the full realization of its purpose.
Modern science speaks of the purpose of an eye, but generally scientists shy away from such language [rehúyen tal lenguaje], claiming that there are no purposes in nature. Aquinas has no such qualms [reparos]. Natural things do have purposes. Furthermore, these purposes, or functions are found in inclinations.1 Indeed, the words "function" and "inclination" are better than "purpose" since "purpose" does seem to imply a person putting the thing to use for some end. Like a purpose, an inclination is a movement to some end, but the inclination is internal to the thing, at least if the inclination is natural.
In the De Veritate, Aquinas distinguishes between two ways in which something can be directed to an end. Those that have knowledge of the end, namely, human beings, can direct themselves; those lacking knowledge of the end can be directed by something that does have knowledge, as an arrow is directed to a target by an archer. Aquinas then further divides the latter category.
This direction from another can happen in two ways. Sometimes, that which is directed toward the end is impelled and moved by the one directing, but it itself does not acquire a form (from the one directing) through which the direction or inclination belongs to it. Such an inclination is violent, as the arrow is inclined by the archer to a determinate target.
Sometimes, however, that which is directed or inclined toward an end acquires (from the one directing) a form through which the inclination belongs to. Such inclination will be natural…. In this way all natural things are inclined to that which is fitting to them, having in themselves some principle of their own inclination on account of which the inclination is natural, so that in some manner they go toward their proper ends of their own accord, and are not only led toward the ends. (De Veritate 22, I)2

Aquinas teleology clearly asserts itself. Without this teleology nothing is really good or bad in nature. Perhaps we might ascribe purpose to things in nature, the way we ascribe purpose to artifacts we make. In Aquinas's view, that would make all things like the arrow. Any purpose of inclination would be external and violent; the inclination would not really belong to the thing and neither would the thing really be good
A knife does not truly have a purpose of its own; in this respect, it is more like the arrow propelled to the target than like an eye with its own inclination to see. The knife is simply metal shaped in a certain way. If this metal has no purpose, then it has no good. The word "knife" picks out this shaped metal together with a purpose of cutting; as such, we can speak of good knife. But if the purpose does not belong to the metal, then neither does the goodness. The purpose does pick out something real, but it is not in the metal. It indicates same thing about the person who uses the metal, or the person who made the shape metal, or the society that generally uses the metal in certain ways.
If nature does truly move to an end by some internal principle, then things in nature can be truly good. An eye, for instance, is good insofar as it realizes its function of seeing. The term "good" picks out a state of affairs. It describes the state of the eye in relation to a function, which is part of what the eye really is. As such, the knowledge of a good eye is speculative
En consecuencia: algo es bueno para el hombre en la medida en que le hace mejor hombre



p. 67 For this reason, Aquinas says that the good is a certain kind of cause, namely, final cause, and he equates the good with the end. The very fact of desire, or inclination, indicates that a thing does not exist for itself; it is moving to achieve something beyond itself. By itself, it is not its own reason to be; it is incomplete and finds its completion in some end. As Mclnerny puts it, "Trying-to-get presumably involves something one has not got. Appetition thus suggests a want or or lack, a negation, in the subject of appetite, of the one trying to get." (Mclnerny, "Naturalism," 239). Consequently, desire is the most fundamental indicator of an end. Desire might be called the first effect of final causality. P. 68
The desire, however, is not arbitrary. It depends upon some real attributes in the thing desired. The thing must have what it takes to complete the individual in some manner or other. We do not simply desire things whimsically, and then call them good. Rather, we have some potential that needs completion, and only objects having the attributes necessary for completion can be desired and called good.
To put matters differently, the desire itself has a character. It is not simply like an arrow-pointer facing first west, then north, then east, and finally south; the pointer is indifferent in itself which direction it faces. Not so for desire or inclination. The desire arises from what is lacking in the agent. The agent has a certain character that moves out toward what fulfills it. Its character, then, and the character of its desire, depends upon the object of desire.
-------------------------


4- On the contrast between "purposes" and "end", se Francis Slade, "End and Purposes", in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 30 (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997)- See also Robert Sokolowski, "What Is Natural Law.’ Human Purposes and Natural Ends," Thomist 68 (2004): 507-29
2 Dupliciter autem contingit aliquid ordinari vel dirigi in aliquid sicut in finem: uno modo per seipsum, sicut homo qui seipsum dirigit ad locum quo tendit; alio modo ab altero, sicut sagitta quae a sagittante ad determinatum locum dirigitur. A se quidem in finem dirigi non possunt nisi illa quae finem cognoscunt. Oportet enim dirigens habere notitiam eius in quod dirigit. Sed ab alio possunt dirigi in finem determinatum etiam quae finem non cognoscunt sicut patet de sagitta. Sed hoc dupliciter contingit. Quandoque enim id quod dirigitur in finem, solummodo impellitur et movetur a dirigente, sine hoc quod aliquam formam a dirigente consequatur per quam ei competat talis directio vel inclinatio; et talis inclinatio est violenta, sicut sagitta inclinatur a sagittante ad signum determinatum. Aliquando autem id quod dirigitur vel inclinatur in finem, consequitur a dirigente vel movente aliquam formam per quam sibi talis inclinatio competat: unde et talis inclinatio erit naturalis, quasi habens principium naturale; sicut ille qui dedit lapidi gravitatem, inclinavit ipsum ad hoc quod deorsum naturaliter ferretur; per quem modum generans est motor in gravibus et levibus, secundum Philosophum in lib. Viii physic.. Et per hunc modum omnes res naturales, in ea quae eis conveniunt, sunt inclinata, habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium, ratione cuius eorum inclinatio naturalis est, ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant, et non solum ducantur in fines debitos. Violenta enim tantummodo ducuntur, quia nil conferunt moventi; sed naturalia etiam vadunt in finem, in quantum cooperantur inclinanti et dirigenti per principium eis inditum. Quod autem dirigitur vel inclinatur in aliquid ab aliquo, in id inclinatur quod est intentum ab eo qui inclinat vel dirigit; sicut in idem signum sagitta dirigitur quo sagittator intendit. Unde, cum omnia naturalia naturali quadam inclinatione sint inclinata in fines suos a primo motore, qui est Deus, oportet quod id in quod unumquodque naturaliter inclinatur, sit id quod est volitum vel intentum a Deo. Deus autem, cum non habeat alium suae voluntatis finem nisi seipsum, et ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis: oportet quod omnia alia naturaliter sint inclinata in bonum. Appetere autem nihil aliud est quam aliquid petere quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum. Unde, cum omnia sint ordinata et directa a Deo in bonum, et hoc modo quod unicuique insit principium per quod ipsummet tendit in bonum, quasi petens ipsum bonum; oportet dicere, quod omnia naturaliter bonum appetant. Si enim essent omnia inclinata in bonum sine hoc quod haberent in se aliquod inclinationis principium, possent dici ducta in bonum: sed non appetentia bonum; sed ratione inditi principii dicuntur omnia appetere bonum, quasi sponte tendentia in bonum: propter quod etiam dicitur sapient., VII, vers. 1, quod divina sapientia disponit omnia suaviter, quia unumquodque ex suo motu tendit in id in quod est divinitus ordinatum.