The new natural law theory provides no way of reconciling conflicting desire
217 The new natural law theory provides no way of reconciling conflicting desires for basic goods. Anna now desires knowledge and she also desires play, both of which have been described as basic goods within the new natural law theory. Which does she choose, since she cannot do both at once? If she has an ultimate end to which she can compare them, then she has a means of determining which is better to do right now. But if they are both incommensurable basic goods — having no higher standard by which they can be evaluated — then she must simply choose. Her preference is all that matters. She moves from something like an imperfect desire (since she has not yet chosen between these basic goods) to a full-fledged desire. How? She has no natural desire that is full-fledged, no desire more complete then her desire for the basic goods. Only her own uncaused preference, then, can decide between basic goods, moving her desire for these goods from imperfect to perfect.