Derechos humanos en general > Fundamento > Renuncia al fundamento
RESUMEN:
Una convicción extendida entre los relativistas es la causa común frente a la civilización europea, e implícitamente al cristianismo: «For this was also the time when Europe sought to fulfil its civilising mission by the application of a European truth onto the (presumed) blank slate of the world». No hay que mirar tanto al pasado -dice Chesterman- para justificar los derechos humanos, sino al presente y a nuestro al rededor. Y así propone un especie de análisis trascultural mundial sobre el modo en que la gente de la calle valora los derechos huamano, para coger lo comunmente aceptado como válido. Se apoya en Davi Jacobson para argumentar sobre la nueva sociedas internacional, hecha más de ciudadanos, que de naciones.
Una convicción extendida entre los relativistas es la causa común frente a la civilización europea, e implícitamente al cristianismo: «For this was also the time when Europe sought to fulfil its civilising mission by the application of a European truth onto the (presumed) blank slate of the world». No hay que mirar tanto al pasado -dice Chesterman- para justificar los derechos humanos, sino al presente y a nuestro al rededor. Y así propone un especie de análisis trascultural mundial sobre el modo en que la gente de la calle valora los derechos huamano, para coger lo comunmente aceptado como válido. Se apoya en Davi Jacobson para argumentar sobre la nueva sociedas internacional, hecha más de ciudadanos, que de naciones.
TEXTUAL:
For this was also the time when Europe sought to fulfil its civilising mission by the application of a European truth onto the (presumed) blank slate of the world
(...)
I argued that the emergence of the human rights discourse is referable to the development of a Western perception of the self (as well as other historical conditions). How, then, can the problematic origins of human rights be reconciled with their increasingly universal (that is, widely recognised) status? This is a common but misleading rendering of the question. For the task of the legal philosopher, surely, is not to construct retrospectively an uncontested origin in order to grant legitimacy to human rights, but to explain and build on their near global recognition today. This is the political question that was unpacked in Part I what remains is the methodological question of how the problematic origins of human rights affect this subsequent recognition.
(...)
From this perspective, the utility of such debates to increased acceptance of standards is limited. Instead, a more productive line of inquiry is to focus on cross-cultural engagement with the discourse of rights, exhibited through participation in the
interpretive community that gives them contemporary meaning.
(...)
He [Jacobson] argues that transnational migration is steadily eroding the traditional basis of nation-state membership, namely citizenship [*]
[*] David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996),
For this was also the time when Europe sought to fulfil its civilising mission by the application of a European truth onto the (presumed) blank slate of the world
(...)
I argued that the emergence of the human rights discourse is referable to the development of a Western perception of the self (as well as other historical conditions). How, then, can the problematic origins of human rights be reconciled with their increasingly universal (that is, widely recognised) status? This is a common but misleading rendering of the question. For the task of the legal philosopher, surely, is not to construct retrospectively an uncontested origin in order to grant legitimacy to human rights, but to explain and build on their near global recognition today. This is the political question that was unpacked in Part I what remains is the methodological question of how the problematic origins of human rights affect this subsequent recognition.
(...)
From this perspective, the utility of such debates to increased acceptance of standards is limited. Instead, a more productive line of inquiry is to focus on cross-cultural engagement with the discourse of rights, exhibited through participation in the
interpretive community that gives them contemporary meaning.
(...)
He [Jacobson] argues that transnational migration is steadily eroding the traditional basis of nation-state membership, namely citizenship [*]
[*] David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996),
FUENTE:
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture, Ed., 1998 I The Age of Rights: Bobbio and the Search for Foundations. B We hold these truths to be self-evident
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture, Ed., 1998 I The Age of Rights: Bobbio and the Search for Foundations. B We hold these truths to be self-evident
FUENTE AMPLIADA:
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture Ed. , , 1998
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture Ed. , , 1998
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