Derechos humanos en general > Fundamento > Renuncia al fundamento
RESUMEN:
It cannot be said that while natural law was at its most credible that human rights were more respected than they are now
It cannot be said that while natural law was at its most credible that human rights were more respected than they are now
COMENTARIO:
«It cannot be said that while natural law was at its most credible that human rights were more respected than they are now»(...)
Hablando de Bobbio, dice:
«This leads him [BOBBIO] to state that the fundamental problem of human rights is not so much how to justify them, but how to protect them. And this is a political, rather than a philosophical problem.»
It cannot be said that while natural law was at its most credible that human rights were more respected than they are now
(...)
Hablando de Bobbio, dice:
This leads him [BOBBIO] to state that the fundamental problem of human rights is not so much how to justify them, but how to protect them. And this is a political, rather than a philosophical problem.
Se remite a See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights (1993), como modelo de autor que critíca la reflexión sobre los derechos humanos con independencia de su práctica.
«It cannot be said that while natural law was at its most credible that human rights were more respected than they are now»(...)
Hablando de Bobbio, dice:
«This leads him [BOBBIO] to state that the fundamental problem of human rights is not so much how to justify them, but how to protect them. And this is a political, rather than a philosophical problem.»
It cannot be said that while natural law was at its most credible that human rights were more respected than they are now
(...)
Hablando de Bobbio, dice:
This leads him [BOBBIO] to state that the fundamental problem of human rights is not so much how to justify them, but how to protect them. And this is a political, rather than a philosophical problem.
Se remite a See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights (1993), como modelo de autor que critíca la reflexión sobre los derechos humanos con independencia de su práctica.
FUENTE:
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture, Ed., 1998 I The Age of Rights: Bobbio and the Search for Foundations
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture, Ed., 1998 I The Age of Rights: Bobbio and the Search for Foundations
FUENTE AMPLIADA:
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture Ed. , , 1998
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture Ed. , , 1998
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