Derechos humanos en general > Fundamento > Pretension relativista de fundamentación
RESUMEN:
"¡No quiero ser criatura!" Esta idea la expresa refinadamente Chesterman cuando postula una doctrina de los derechos humanos cuyo contenido venga enteramente configurado por sus titulares, y no por imposiciones o cliches "culturales". Aquí se enmarcaría toda la filosofía del género...
"¡No quiero ser criatura!" Esta idea la expresa refinadamente Chesterman cuando postula una doctrina de los derechos humanos cuyo contenido venga enteramente configurado por sus titulares, y no por imposiciones o cliches "culturales". Aquí se enmarcaría toda la filosofía del género...
TEXTUAL:
The implications that this has for the practice of human rights advocacy repeat, with a difference, the points made in the preceding sections of this article. It is not enough to effect change from the outside. For meaningful transformation in both the perception and reality of human rights, the subjects of rights must themselves own those rights. The history of human rights documents this: citizen-subjects taking sovereign power in their own hands in the first revolutions (the sovereign people beheading the royal sovereignty88); African and other colonised peoples coming to own decolonisation in the early years of the United Nations;89 women taking power in the various waves and schools of feminist interventions.90 In different ways, these demonstrate a form of empowerment not simply in the new left sense of the word as having power to control their own affairs,[91] but in an emergent relation to self that transcends the limitations of the historico-political structure that purports to define that self.
This translates to an interminable (even if incomplete) demand for politicisation: an emancipatory politics premised on a self-critical methodology that is rigorous to the point of reinventing itself with each step that is taken.[92] Such a politics acts not in the somewhat naïve sense of calculated implementation of a programme, but in the sense of a maximum intensification of a transformation in progress.[93] This, then, is the emancipatory ethic that informs this article: an ethics not of ideology or theology but method, seeking to bring about change not by the institution of structure but by emancipation from culture
[91] Cf. John Chesterman, Poverty Law and Social Change: The Story of the Fitzroy Legal Service (Melbourne: Melbourne UP, 1996), pp. 13-16, 37.
[92] Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 28.
[93] Ibid., p. 9.
The implications that this has for the practice of human rights advocacy repeat, with a difference, the points made in the preceding sections of this article. It is not enough to effect change from the outside. For meaningful transformation in both the perception and reality of human rights, the subjects of rights must themselves own those rights. The history of human rights documents this: citizen-subjects taking sovereign power in their own hands in the first revolutions (the sovereign people beheading the royal sovereignty88); African and other colonised peoples coming to own decolonisation in the early years of the United Nations;89 women taking power in the various waves and schools of feminist interventions.90 In different ways, these demonstrate a form of empowerment not simply in the new left sense of the word as having power to control their own affairs,[91] but in an emergent relation to self that transcends the limitations of the historico-political structure that purports to define that self.
This translates to an interminable (even if incomplete) demand for politicisation: an emancipatory politics premised on a self-critical methodology that is rigorous to the point of reinventing itself with each step that is taken.[92] Such a politics acts not in the somewhat naïve sense of calculated implementation of a programme, but in the sense of a maximum intensification of a transformation in progress.[93] This, then, is the emancipatory ethic that informs this article: an ethics not of ideology or theology but method, seeking to bring about change not by the institution of structure but by emancipation from culture
[91] Cf. John Chesterman, Poverty Law and Social Change: The Story of the Fitzroy Legal Service (Melbourne: Melbourne UP, 1996), pp. 13-16, 37.
[92] Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 28.
[93] Ibid., p. 9.
FUENTE:
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture, Ed., 1998 I The Age of Rights: Bobbio and the Search for Foundations. B We hold these truths to be self-evident
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture, Ed., 1998 I The Age of Rights: Bobbio and the Search for Foundations. B We hold these truths to be self-evident
FUENTE AMPLIADA:
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture Ed. , , 1998
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture Ed. , , 1998
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